The Internet is a busy place. Every second, approximately 6,000 tweets are tweeted; more than 40,000 Google queries are searched; and more than 2 million emails are sent, according to Internet Live Stats, a website of the international Real Time Statistics Project.

But these statistics only hint at the size of the Web. As of September 2014, there were 1 billion websites on the Internet, a number that fluctuates by the minute as sites go defunct and others are born. And beneath this constantly changing (but sort of quantifiable) Internet that’s familiar to most people lies the “Deep Web,” which includes things Google and other search engines don’t index. Deep Web content can be as innocuous as the results of a search of an online database or as secretive as black-market forums accessible only to those with special Tor software. (Though Tor isn’t only for illegal activity, it’s used wherever people might have reason to go anonymous online.)

Combine the constant change in the “surface” Web with the unquantifiability of the Deep Web, and it’s easy to see why estimating the size of the Internet is a difficult task. However, analysts say the Web is big and getting bigger.

Data-driven

With about 1 billion websites, the Web is home to many more individual Web pages. One of these pages, www.worldwidewebsize.com, seeks to quantify the number using research by Internet consultant Maurice de Kunder. De Kunder and his colleagues published their methodology in February 2016 in the journal Scientometrics. To come to an estimate, the researchers sent a batch of 50 common words to be searched by Google and Bing. The researchers knew how frequently these words have appeared in print in general, allowing them to extrapolate the total number of pages out there based on how many contain the reference words. Search engines overlap in the pages they index, so the method also requires estimating and subtracting the likely overlap.

According to these calculations, there were at least 4.66 billion Web pages online as of mid-March 2016. This calculation covers only the searchable Web, however, not the Deep Web.

So how much information does the Internet hold? There are three ways to look at that question, said Martin Hilbert, a professor of communications at the University of California, Davis.

“The Internet stores information, the Internet communicates information and the Internet computes information,” Hilbert told Live Science. The communication capacity of the Internet can be measured by how much information it can transfer, or how much information it does transfer at any given time, he said.

In 2014, researchers published a study in the journal Supercomputing Frontiers and Innovations estimating the storage capacity of the Internet at 10^²⁴ bytes, or 1 million exabytes. A byte is a data unit comprising 8 bits, and is equal to a single character in one of the words you’re reading now. An exabyte is 1 billion billion bytes.

One way to estimate the communication capacity of the Internet is to measure the traffic moving through it. According to Cisco’s Visual Networking Index initiative, the Internet is now in the “zettabyte era.” A zettabyte equals 1 sextillion bytes, or 1,000 exabytes. By the end of 2016, global Internet traffic will reach 1.1 zettabytes per year, according to Cisco, and by 2019, global traffic is expected to hit 2 zettabytes per year.

One zettabyte is the equivalent of 36,000 years of high-definition video, which, in turn, is the equivalent of streaming Netflix’s entire catalog 3,177 times, Thomas Barnett Jr., Cisco’s director of thought leadership, wrote in a 2011 blog post about the company’s findings.

In 2011, Hilbert and his colleagues published a paper in the journal Science estimating the communication capacity of the Internet at 3 x 10^¹² kilobits per second, a measure of bandwidth. This was based on hardware capacity, and not on how much information was actually being transferred at any moment.

In one particularly offbeat study, an anonymous hacker measured the size of the Internet by counting how many IPs (Internet Protocols) were in use. IPs are the wayposts of the Internet through which data travels, and each device online has at least one IP address. According to the hacker’s estimate, there were 1.3 billion IP addresses used online in 2012.

The Internet has vastly altered the data landscape. In 2000, before Internet use became ubiquitous, telecommunications capacity was 2.2 optimally compressed exabytes, Hilbert and his colleagues found. In 2007, the number was 65. This capacity includes phone networks and voice calls as well as access to the enormous information reservoir that is the Internet. However, data traffic over mobile networks was already outpacing voice traffic in 2007, the researchers found.

Editor’s note: Original Source: ‘Live Science’

Stephanie Pappas. “How big is the Internet, Really?”

Live Science. N.p., Web. 21 July. 2016.

More than three years ago, the former national security officials penned an op-ed to raise awareness among the public, the business community and Congress of the serious threat to the nation’s well-being posed by the massive theft of intellectual property, technology and business information by the Chinese government through cyber-exploitation.

In the wake of global controversy over government surveillance, a number of U.S. technology companies have developed and are offering their users what we call ubiquitous encryption — that is, end-to-end encryption of data with only the sender and intended recipient possessing decryption keys. With this technology, the plain text of messages is inaccessible to the companies offering the products or services as well as to the government, even with lawfully authorized access for public safety or law enforcement purposes.

The FBI director and the Justice Department have raised serious and legitimate concerns that ubiquitous encryption without a second decryption key in the hands of a third party would allow criminals to keep their communications secret, even when law enforcement officials have court-approved authorization to access those communications. There also are concerns about such encryption providing secure communications to national security intelligence targets such as terrorist organizations and nations operating counter to U.S. national security interests.

Several other nations are pursuing access to encrypted communications. In Britain, Parliament is considering requiring technology companies to build decryption capabilities for authorized government access into products and services offered in that country. The Chinese have proposed similar approaches to ensure that the government can monitor the content and activities of their citizens.

We recognize the importance our officials attach to being able to decrypt a coded communication under a warrant or similar legal authority. But the issue that has not been addressed is the competing priorities that support the companies’ resistance to building in a back door or duplicated key for decryption. We believe that the greater public good is a secure communications infrastructure protected by ubiquitous encryption at the device, server and enterprise level without building in means for government monitoring.

First, such an encryption system would protect individual privacy and business information from exploitation at a much higher level than exists today. As a recent MIT paper explains, requiring duplicate keys introduces vulnerabilities in encryption that raise the risk of compromise and theft by bad actors. If third-party key holders have less than perfect security, they may be hacked and the duplicate key exposed. This is no theoretical possibility, as evidenced by major cyberintrusions into supposedly secure government databases and the successful compromise of security tokensheld by a major information security firm. Furthermore, requiring a duplicate key rules out security techniques, such as one-time-only private keys.

Second, a requirement that U.S. technology providers create a duplicate key will not prevent malicious actors from finding other technology providers who will furnish ubiquitous encryption. The smart bad guys will find ways and technologies to avoid access, and we can be sure that the “dark Web” marketplace will offer myriad such capabilities. This could lead to a perverse outcome in which law-abiding organizations and individuals lack protected communications but malicious actors have them.

Finally, and most significantly, if the United States can demand that companies make available a duplicate key, other nations such as China will insist on the same. There will be no principled basis to resist that legal demand. The result will be to expose business, political and personal communications to a wide spectrum of governmental access regimes with varying degrees of due process.

Strategically, the interests of U.S. businesses are essential to protecting U.S. national security interests. After all, political power and military power are derived from economic strength. If the United States is to maintain its global role and influence, protecting business interests from massive economic espionage is essential. And that imperative may outweigh the tactical benefit of making encrypted communications more easily accessible to Western authorities.

History teaches that the fear that ubiquitous encryption will cause our security to go dark is overblown. There was a great debate about encryption in the early ’90s. When the mathematics of “public key” encryption were discovered as a way to provide encryption protection broadly and cheaply to all users, some national security officials were convinced that if the technology were not restricted, law enforcement and intelligence organizations would go dark or deaf.

As a result, the idea of “escrowed key,” known as Clipper Chip, was introduced. The concept was that unbreakable encryption would be provided to individuals and businesses, but the keys could be obtained from escrow by the government under court authorization for legitimate law enforcement or intelligence purposes.

The Clinton administration and Congress rejected the Clipper Chip based on the reaction from business and the public. In addition, restrictions were relaxed on the export of encryption technology. But the sky did not fall, and we did not go dark and deaf. Law enforcement and intelligence officials simply had to face a new future. As witnesses to that new future, we can attest that our security agencies were able to protect national security interests to an even greater extent in the ’90s and into the new century.

Today, with almost everyone carrying a networked device on his or her person, ubiquitous encryption provides essential security. If law enforcement and intelligence organizations face a future without assured access to encrypted communications, they will develop technologies and techniques to meet their legitimate mission goals.

Editor’s note: Article reposted from ‘The Washington Post’

Mike McConnell, Michael Chertoff, William Lynn. “Why the fear over ubiquitous data encryption is overblown”

The Washing Post. N.p., Web. 23 June. 2016.

As the more subtle attempts at undermining security become impossible, spies will have to find alternative routes to access their targets. Earlier this year the UK government published the legal framework under which GCHQ and other British spies can hack, use bugging devices (or even steal and replace) computers, servers, routers, laptops, and mobile phones to either obtain information or conduct surveillance.

The guidelines create a legal framework for such behaviour under UK law, and even okays potential intelligence gathering activities which involved hacking attempts against people who are themselves not targets of intelligence agencies.

This gives some credence to Snowden’s recent claim that intelligence agencies are targeting IT staff because they have access to systems and databases.

It’s also worth noting that, despite the anguished howls from law enforcement, spy agencies and others still have plenty of data left to sift.

Firstly, encryption is really, really hard to get right: as projects like Bullrun and others have proved, the intelligence agencies and law enforcement still have plenty of ways around it. There are legal tools, for example: the UK has legislation in place which makes it an offence to not hand over encryption keys when requested by law enforcement, punishable by up to five years in prison.

And while many tech companies may well encrypt customers’ data when it is on the move — such as between datacentres — many will not secure it entirely using end-to-end encryption.

Why? Simply because they need to look at that your email or web browsing themselves in order to sell advertising against the subject matter of the email.

The advertising-driven business models of Silicon Valley rule out the pervasive use of strong end-to-end encryption, and that means intelligence agencies and police can continue to gain access to vast amounts of information.

Police and intelligence agencies still have plenty of other data sources — the metadata on communications, including who you have called, when, and for how long, CCTV, and more.

“Law enforcement agencies have access to more data now than they have had in the history of time. Pre-Facebook, how hard would it be for any law enforcement agency on the planet to find out all your known associates? They’d have to question dozens of people to find out who it is you know. They are able to get access to vast amounts of information just by asking,” said Privacy International’s Hosein.

“They complain that they’re not getting enough information but they’ve had more than they’ve ever had before,” he added.

Edinburgh Napier University’s Buchanan echoes the sentiment: “There are now so many ways that investigators can actually investigate someone who is suspected of committing a crime there isn’t really a problem. This isn’t going to shut the door.” Good old-fashioned policing and follow-the-money are still the most effective ways of catching the bad guys.

And widespread usage of strong encryption is not the worst scenario for the spies: harder to crack and harder to detect technologies are already either in existence or in development.

One such technology is steganography — hiding communications within digital images — and it’s incredibly hard to spot. Equally, quantum encryption could do away with the inherent weakness of the public key infrastructure systems used today and make messages impossible to intercept.

Still, even the experts don’t really know how the future of encryption is going to play out: there is apparently no way of accommodating both the desire of the intelligence agencies to be able to access the data they want with the safe and secure working of the web as we know it.

They are mutually exclusive, and mutually antagonistic. Like the best encryption, the problem of making national security and privacy work together seems uncrackable.

“Many of us agree with the sentiment — I am one of them — that from a security perspective you don’t want people who would do you harm being able to talk in secret. But at the same time if your answer to that is to ban encryption, that is a very bad way; the technology is not good or evil, it is the people using it,” said the University of Surrey’s Woodward.

Technology is unlikely to offer a way out of this impasse. As the power of supercomputers (or more likely giant cloud arrays) continues to grow, it’s easy enough to increase the size of the key — from 516, to 1024, to 2048 and onwards.

Even quantum computers, long touted as a way of cracking all encryption almost immediately, become widespread the reality is that, although they would undermine encryption in one way, they will also boost it again (thanks to something called quantum key distribution). And as Woodward notes “we’ve been talking about viable quantum computers since the 80s and they’re always 10 years away.”

But the stakes may continue to rise, as least from a certain point of view.

“The security of our common computing infrastructure is even more important now than it was back then. Back in the 1990s, the reason we won was because every economy wanted to be the best marketplace for ecommerce on the planet so they knew they could not put constraints on security technology if they wanted to enable all that ecommerce,” said Privacy International’s Hosein.

And soon those issues of privacy and security will become as concrete as the buildings we live in. With the advent of smart grids, the internet of things and smart cities, we will be using the web to monitor and control real-world systems. “If we can’t secure these things, then people will die,” he warns.

This also raises another issue: as our houses and even clothes are filled with sensors, what sort of privacy is appropriate? Is it right that we should be snooped on through our smart TV or networked baby monitor, or our webcams or smartwatches? Can we draw a line anywhere?

When President Obama was asked about the issue of encryption his response was nuanced. While he said he supported strong encryption he also noted: “The first time an attack takes place and it turns out that we had a lead and we couldn’t follow up on it, the public is going to demand answers, and so this is a public conversation that we should end up having.”

It’s entirely possible to argue that we don’t need another public debate about encryption: that we had one back in the 1990s. And that privacy had trumped national security when it came to the use of strong encryption. It’s just that the intelligence services didn’t like the answer.

But there are plenty of good reasons why we do need to go over the arguments about encryption again.

Back in the 1990s and 2000s, encryption was a complicated, minority interest. Now it is becoming easy and mainstream, not just for authenticating transactions but for encrypting data and communications.

Back then, it was also mostly a US debate because that was where most strong encryption was developed. But that’s no longer the case: encryption software can be written anywhere and by anyone, which means no one country cannot dictate global policy anymore.

Consider this: the right to privacy has long been considered a qualified rather than an absolute right — one that can be infringed, for example, on the grounds of public safety, or to prevent a crime, or in the interests of national security. Few would agree that criminals or terrorists have the right to plot in secret.

What the widespread use of strong, well-implemented encryption does is promotes privacy to an absolute right. If you have encrypted a hard drive or a smartphone correctly, it cannot be unscrambled (or at least not for a few hundred thousand years).

At a keystroke, it makes absolute privacy a reality, and thus rewrites one of the fundamental rules by which societies have been organised. No wonder the intelligence services have been scrambling to tackle our deliberately scrambled communications.

And our fear of crime — terrorism in particular — has created another issue. We have demanded that the intelligence services and law enforcement try to reduce the risk of attack, and have accepted that they will gradually chip away at privacy in order to do that.

However, what we haven’t managed as a society is to decide what is an acceptable level of risk that such terrible acts might occur. Without that understanding of what constitutes an acceptable level of risk, any reduction in our privacy or civil liberties — whether breaking encryption or mass surveillance — becomes palatable.

The point is often made that cars kill people and yet we still drive. We need to have a better discussion about what is an acceptable level of safety that we as a society require, and what is the impact on our privacy as a result.

As the University of Surrey’s Woodward notes: “Some of these things one might have to accept. Unfortunately there might not be any easy way around it, without the horrible unintended consequences. You make your enemies less safe but you also make your friends less safe by [attacking] encryption — and that is not a sensible thing to do.”

And while the US can no longer dictate policy on encryption, it could be the one to take a lead which others can follow.

White House cybersecurity coordinator Michael Daniel recently argued that, as governments and societies are still wrestling with the issue of encryption, the US should come up with the policies and processes and “the philosophical underpinnings of what we want to do as a society with this so we can make the argument for that around the planet… to say, this is how free societies should come at this.”

But he doesn’t underestimate the scale of the problem, either. Speaking at an event organised by the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation, he said: “Working at the White House, we don’t get easy problems, easy problems get solved someplace else, they don’t come to us. This is one of the hardest problems I know about, certainly that’s anywhere close to my job. And I think it’s clearly not one that’s going to be resolved easily, simply or quickly.”

Which brings us back to those civil war codenames, Bullrun and Edgehill, which may serve as an inadvertent, gloomy prophecy about the future effectiveness of the intelligence agencies, unless we have a better discussion about how security and privacy can work together online.

If not, it’s worth remembering the Cavaliers and the Confederates both won the first battles of the English and American civil wars, just as both would finally lose their bloody and divisive civil war. Perhaps, after a few early victories in the new crypto war, the intelligence agencies may face a similar defeat, outpaced by encryption in the long term.

It may be that in a few decades, the spies look back at the tribulations of the first and second crypto wars with something approaching nostalgia.

Editor’s note:

Steve Ranger. “The undercover war on your internet secrets: How online surveillance cracked our trust in the web– TechRepublic”

TechRepublic. N.p., Web. 10 June. 2016.

A black shrouded figure appears on the screen, looming over the rapt audience, talking about surveillance. But this is no Big Brother figure seeking obedience though, rather the opposite.Perhaps even his nemesis.

NSA contractor-turned-whistleblower Edward Snowden is explaining how his former employer and other intelligence agencies have worked to undermine privacy on the internet and beyond.

“We’re seeing systemic attacks on the fabrics of our systems, the fabric of our communications… by undermining the security of our communications, they enable surveillance,” he warns.

He is speaking at the conference via a video link from Russia, where he has taken refuge after leaking the documents detailing some of the NSA’s surveillance projects. The room behind him is in darkness, giving away nothing about his exact location.

“Surveillance is not possible when our movements and communications are safe and protected — a satellite cannot see you when you are inside your home — but an unprotected computer with an open webcam can,” he adds.

One of the most significant technologies being targeted by the intelligence services is encryption.

Online, encryption surrounds us, binds us, identifies us. It protects things like our credit card transactions and medical records, encoding them so that — unless you have the key — the data appears to be meaningless nonsense.

Encryption is one of the elemental forces of the web, even though it goes unnoticed and unremarked by the billions of people that use it every day.

But that doesn’t mean that the growth in the use of encryption isn’t controversial.

For some, strong encryption is the cornerstone of security and privacy in any digital communications, whether that’s for your selfies or for campaigners against an autocratic regime.

Others, mostly police and intelligence agencies, have become increasingly worried that the absolute secrecy that encryption provides could make it easier for criminals and terrorists to use the internet to plot without fear of discovery.

As such, the outcome of this war over privacy will have huge implications for the future of the web itself.

The code wars

Codes have been used to protect data in transit for thousands of years, and have long been a key tool in warfare: the Caesar cipher was named after the Roman emperor who used it to protect his military secrets from prying eyes.

These ciphers were extremely basic, of course: the Caesar cipher turned a message into code simply by replacing each letter with the one three down in the alphabet, so that ‘a’ became ‘d’.

Ciphers became more sophisticated, and harder to break, over the centuries, but it was the Second World War that demonstrated the real importance of encryption — and cracking it. The work done at Bletchley Park to crack German codes including Enigma had a famous impact on the course of the war.

As a result, once the war was over, encryption technology was put on the US Munitions List alongside tanks and guns as an ‘auxiliary military technology’, which put restrictions on its export.

“The real fundamental problem is the internet and the protocol it’s all based on was never intended to be secure.” - ALAN WOODWARD, SURREY UNIVERSITY

In practice, these government controls didn’t make much difference to ordinary people, as there were few uses for code-making — that is, encryption — outside the military.

But all that changed with the arrival of the personal computer. It became an even bigger issue as the huge economic potential of the web became apparent.

“The internet and the protocol it’s all based on was never intended to be secure, so if we are going to rely on the internet as part of our critical national [and] international infrastructure, which we do, you’ve got to be able to secure it, and the only way to do that is to layer encryption over the top,” explains Professor Alan Woodward, a computer security expert at the University of Surrey.

Few would be willing to use online shopping if their credit card details, address, and what they were buying was being sent across the internet for any to see.

Encryption provides privacy by encoding data onto what appears to be meaningless junk, and it also creates trust by allowing us to prove who we are online — another essential element of doing business over the internet.

“A lot of cryptography isn’t just about keeping things secret, a lot of it is about proving identity,” says Bill Buchanan, professor of computing at Edinburgh Napier University. “There’s a lot of naïveté about cryptography as to thinking it’s just about keeping something safe on your disk.”

But the rise of the internet suddenly meant that access to cryptography became an issue of privacy and economics as well as one of national security, immediately sparking the clash that came to be known as ‘the crypto wars’.

Governments fought to control the use of encryption, while privacy advocates insisted its use was essential — not just for individual freedom, but also to protect the commercial development of the nascent internet.

What followed was a series of skirmishes, as the US government and others made increasingly desperate — and unsuccessful — efforts to reassert control over encryption technologies. One example in the mid-90s involved the NSA designing the Clipper chip, which was a way to give the agency access to the communications on any devices on which the chip was installed.

Another attempt at government control during this period came with the introduction of key escrow. Under the scheme, the US government would agree to license encryption providers, if they gave the state access to the keys used to decode communications.

On top of this were rules which only allowed products that used weak and easily-cracked encryption to be exported from the US.

Remarkably there was an unwelcome reminder of those days of watered-down encryption with the appearance of the recent FREAK flaw in the SSL security standard. The vulnerability could be used to force web browsers to default to the weaker “export-strength” encryption, which can be easily broken.

Few experts even knew that the option to use the weaker encryption still existed in the browsers commonly used today — a good example of the dangerous and unexpected consequences of attempts to control privacy technologies, long after the political decisions affecting it had been reversed and forgotten.

But by the early 2000s, it appeared that the privacy advocates had effectively won the crypto wars. The Clipper chip was abandoned, strong encryption software exports were allowed, key escrow failed, and governments realised it was all but impossible for them to control the use of encryption. It was understood that if they tried, the damage they would do to the internet economy would be too great.

Individual freedoms, and simple economics, had overwhelmed national security. In 2005, one campaigning group even cheerfully announced “The crypto wars are finally over and we won!”

They were wrong.

We now know that the crypto wars were never over. While privacy campaigners celebrated their victory, intelligence agencies were already at work breaking and undermining encryption. The second stage of the crypto wars — the spies’ secret war — had begun.

Editor’s note:

Steve Ranger. “The undercover war on your internet secrets: How online surveillance cracked our trust in the web– TechRepublic”

TechRepublic. N.p., Web. 26 May. 2016.